







- H5N1 avian influenza viruses
- Viruses possessing the 1918 virus HA and NA









8 RNA segments





256

Reverse genetics


Plasmids expressing influenza vRNAs



Plasmids expressing influenza viral proteins




Anti-influenza drugs



M2 inhibitors


- amantadine and rimantadine

Anti-influenza drugs




H5N1 avian influenza virus







Systemic infection



Localized infection




Cleavage of HA

Before cleavage





Host protease

After cleavage



HA cleavage is essential for viral infectivity.




R E R R R K K R R


----- R X X R

Representative experiments with H5N1 viruses

- Determinants affecting pathogenicity of influenza virus -

H5N1 Influenza Chronology in 1997







H5N1 Hong Kong virus
HA cleavage site


R **E** **R** **R** **R** **K** **K** **R** **R**

H5N1 Influenza Chronology in 1997





Systemic Infection




Local Infection

- Importance of high HA cleavability for pathogenicity of the Hong Kong virus in mice
- Molecular basis for the difference in mouse pathogenicity among the Hong Kong viruses


HK483 wild type

RERRRKKR




HK483 mutant

----- RETR




HK483 (R E R R R K K R)

LD₅₀ 1.7 PFU




HK483 (----- R E T R)

LD₅₀ >1 x 10³ PFU




- Importance of high HA cleavability for pathogenicity of the Hong Kong virus in mice
- Molecular basis for the difference in mouse pathogenicity among the Hong Kong viruses

HK483




Systemic Infection

HK486



Local Infection



8 RNA segments

Reassortants between HK483 and HK486 viruses


	PA	PB1	PB2	HA	NP	NA	M	NS	LD ₅₀ = <10
HK483	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	YES
HK486	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	NO
	Red	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	NO
	Blue	Red	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	NO
	Blue	Blue	Red	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	YES
	Blue	Blue	Blue	Red	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	NO
	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Red	Blue	Blue	Blue	NO
	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Red	Blue	Blue	NO
	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Red	Blue	NO
	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Red	NO

Difference between HK483 and HK486

PB2




- Amino acid alteration from glutamic acid to lysine at position 627 of PB2 enhances the pathogenicity of an H5N1 virus in mice.
- All human virus PB2 proteins possess lysine at this position.



Determinants affecting pathogenicity of influenza virus

- HA cleavability
- PB2 amino acid at position 627 and others
- NS1 protein

Sensitivity of H5N1 viruses to oseltamivir




H5N1 viruses isolated since 1997 in Asia

Molecular cloning (genetic material)

RISK ASSESSMENT

- Noninfectious
- Inability to insert into human genome



RISK GROUP 1



**BIOSAFETY
LEVEL**

BSL-2

NIH Guidelines¹, App. B.1; 9 CFR² 121.3f.2

¹ NIH Guidelines, NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules

² 9 CFR 121, Title 9 Code of Federal Regulations

H5N1 viruses isolated since 1997 in Asia

Virus generation, cell culture, experimental infection (mice, ferrets, chickens)

RISK ASSESSMENT

- Known to cause lethal infection in avian species and humans
- Aerosol transmission
- Prophylaxis available
- low human-to-human transmission



RISK GROUP 3



**BIOSAFETY
LEVEL**

**BSL-3
ABSL-3**

H5N1 viruses isolated since 1997 in Asia

Virus generation, cell culture, experimental infection (mice, ferrets, chickens)

SPECIFIC PRACTICES

- 1) Annual vaccination required
- 2) Prophylaxis when aerosols likely
- 3) PAPRs with face shields
- 4) Shower out
- 5) Susceptibility testing of agents



PAPRs: Powered air-purifying respirators

Additional features/procedures in BSL-3 at UW

- 1) Entry/exit through change and shower rooms
- 2) Double-door autoclave
- 3) Shower facilities
- 4) Daily decontamination of work surfaces
- 5) All personal clothing removed in outer change rooms
- 6) Established system for reporting and treating exposures
- 7) Annual inspection by federal regulatory agencies
- 8) Contact with non-experimental mice, ferrets, and chickens is prohibited within one week of contact with experimentally infected animals

Experiments with viruses possessing the 1918 virus genes

The Spanish influenza virus does not exist.





PCR




HA/NA gene
sequence

Reid AH et al. PNAS (1999)
Reid AH et al. PNAS (2000)







1918 virus




Properties of viruses with the 1918 virus HA and/or NA in mice

Virus	Origin of Genes			LD50 (Log ₁₀ PFU)	Virus titer in lung (Log ₁₀ PFU)
	HA	NA	Others		
WSN (H1N1)	WSN	WSN	WSN	3.3	5.0 ± 0.3
WSN/HspNsp	1918	1918	WSN	3.0	5.0 ± 0.1
M88 (H3N2)	M88	M88	M88	>6.2	2.9 ± 0.2
M88/Hsp	1918	K173	M88	4.4	5.1 ± 0.1
M88/HspNsp	1918	1918	M88	5.2	4.7 ± 0.2
K173 (H1N1)	K173	K173	K173	>7.4	3.5 ± 0.3
K173/Hsp	1918	K173	K173	5.2	4.8 ± 0.2
K173/HspNsp	1918	1918	K173	6.9	ND

Detection of viral neutralizing antibodies

Virus	avirus with the  virus HA and NA
Sera	<p>1 year old (born in 2001 )</p> <p>102 years old (born in 1897 )</p> 

Neutralizing antibodies to a virus with the 1918 virus HA and NA




Viruses with the 1918 virus HA and NA genes

Molecular cloning (genetic material)

RISK ASSESSMENT

- Noninfectious
- Inability to insert into human genome



RISK GROUP 1



**BIOSAFETY
LEVEL**

BSL-2

NIH Guidelines¹, App. B.1; 9 CFR² 121.3f.2

¹ NIH Guidelines, NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules

² 9 CFR 121, Title 9 Code of Federal Regulations

Viruses with the 1918 virus HA and NA genes

Virus generation, cell culture, experimental infection (mice)

RISK ASSESSMENT

- Potential risk for human infection
- Increased pathogenicity
- Human population may be susceptible
- Aerosol transmission
- Potential for human-to-human transmission
- Protection with current vaccines ???
- Prophylaxis ???




RISK GROUP 3 or 4 ?




BIOSAFETY
LEVEL

BSL-4

Prophylaxis of a virus with the 1918 virus HA and NA with oseltamivir




Oseltamivir protects mice from challenge with a virus possessing the 1918 virus HA and NA




Antiviral

A virus with the 1918 virus NA is sensitive to oseltamivir carboxylate

In vitro




Mouse model



Vaccine

Protection of mice against a virus with the 1918 HA and NA using inactivated vaccine made from a contemporary H1 strain



Viruses with the 1918 virus HA and NA genes

Virus generation, cell culture, experimental infection (mice)

RISK ASSESSMENT

- Potential risk for human infection
- Likelihood of increased pathogenicity
- Human population may be susceptible
- Aerosol transmission
- Potential for human-to-human transmission
- Current vaccines may offer protection
- Prophylaxis available



RISK GROUP 3



**BIOSAFETY
LEVEL**

BSL-3

Viruses with the 1918 virus HA and NA genes

Virus generation, cell culture, experimental infection (mice)

SPECIFIC PRACTICES

- 1) Annual vaccination required
- 2) Prophylaxis when aerosols likely
- 3) PAPRs with face shields
- 4) Shower out
- 5) Susceptibility testing of agents

PAPRs: Powered air-purifying respirators

Additional features/procedures in BSL-3 at UW

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- 4) Daily decontamination of work surface
- 5) All personal clothing removed in outer change rooms
- 6) Established system for reporting and treating exposures
- 7) Annual inspection by federal regulatory agencies